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Long before the fighting ceased, Jean Monnet was already planning to integrate a
defeated Germany into “a Europe united on terms of equality.”1)François Duchêne,
Jean Monnet: First Statesman of Independence 127 (1994). The idea had been
brewing in the French and Italian resistance during World War II, even since
Germany had been defeated last time around, and before then, in other forms, too.
The key to bringing the warring nations together in solidarity was, as the Schuman
Declaration would explain, taming the age-old animosity between Germany and
France in a supranational project “open to all countries willing to take part.” The
aim, in the words of the Treaty of Rome would be an “ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe.”
The project was anti-hegemonial, but its promise of equality and inclusion came with
flaws from the start. Take only the continued embrace of Europe’s colonial tradition.
Even as the Declaration suggested a kind of horizontal equality within Europe, it
announced with none-too-subtle racial condescension that the resulting increase
in resources would allow Europe to strive toward completing “one of her essential
tasks, namely, the development of the African continent” (emphasis added) – as if
Europe was somehow in charge of Africa. Along the way, the pervasive erasure of
race from European public discourse in reaction to the Nazi era meant combating
race discrimination would be put off for decades, and remain slow after that.2)Iyiola
Solanke, Making Anti-Racial Discrimination Law: A comparative history of social
action and racial anti-discrimination law (2009); Mathias Möschel, ‘Race in mainland
European legal analysis: towards a European critical race theory’, 34 Ethnic and
Racial Studies 1648-1664 (2011); Jeffrey Miller and Fernanda Nicola, ‘The Failure
to Grapple with Racial Capitalism in European Constitutionalism’, ICourts Working
Paper No. 201, IMAGINE Paper No. 8 (2020), available here. Fast forward to today,
and although strides toward equality have been made, unreflective majoritarian
bias, in particular but not only toward racial minorities, remains deep in the heart
of Europe.3)Cf., e.g., Case C-157/15, Achbita v. G4S, ECLI:EU:C:2017:203; Case
C-188/15, Bougnaoui v. Micropole, ECLI:EU:C:2017:204; Gareth Davies, ‘Achbita v.
G4S: Religious Equality Squeezed between Profit and Prejudice’, Eurpean Law Blog,
6 April 2017, available here.
The focus on taming the age-old animosity between Germany and France also
meant these two Member States were more equal than the others. Even as the
qualified majority system was to keep Germany in line with the other big Member
States and boost the smaller ones, Germany and France would usually sort
things out for all. Along the way, there was joint leadership on such matters as
the Schengen Agreement,4)See, e.g., Georges Saunier, ‘A Special Relationship:
Franco-German Relations at the Time of François Mitterand and Helmut Kohl’, in
Carine Germond and Henning Tu#rk (eds.), A History of Franco-German relations
- 1 -
in Europe: from “hereditary enemies” to partners 235, 237 (2008). and a largely
Franco-German Euro deal, whereby France relinquished its veto over German
unification while Germany gave up its currency but embedded its restrictive
monetary and fiscal policy preferences into the treaties. Fast forward to today, and
we have joint cabinet meetings and policy leadership by the only two Member States
without whom the Union still cannot proceed.
In structural terms, the founders created an elite system of integration. Even as it
promised to bring the peoples of Europe together, it kept the people themselves
at bay, seeking to persuade by dirigiste output. Along the way, it meant eventual
elections to a parliament that took decades to become a (second-class) legislative
body of the Union. And fast forward to today, Union governance has yet to become
accountable to a democratic electorate in a satisfactory manner.
Germany has fared well in this imperfect union – but not by shaping Europe’s
legal culture or method, as Carl Schmitt envisioned. As with so much of Schmitt,
his analytically brilliant, richly comparative, and broadly inter-disciplinary analysis
painted an aspirational picture that was anti-democratic and deeply nationalistic. In
his Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft, Schmitt spoke of the emergence
of an anti-positivist European legal science under the leadership of the Germanic
historical tradition of (fellow anti-Semite) Friedrich Carl von Savigny.5)Carl Schmitt,
Die Lage der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft (1950). Schmitt requires no
further elaboration regarding the parenthetical. As for Savigny, he thought the
emancipation of the Jews misguided and even “unnatural,” as “in their inner being
Jews will completely remain foreigners to us,” Savigny, ‘Stimmen für und wider neue
Gesetzbücher’, 3 Zeitschrift für geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft. 1, 25 (1817).
Savigny put his beliefs into action, for example, when voting to have his Hegelian
colleague Eduard Gans, whom he despised, removed, in part because “we do not
know whether Dr. Gans, who belongs to a well-known Jewish family, personally
converted to Christianity, and whether therefore on this aspect there might not be
an obstacle to his employment in public service.” Die juristische Fakultät an das
Ministerium (Berlin, 4. April 1820), in Max Lenz, 4 Geschichte der Königlichen
Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Berlin 448, 449 (1910). As far as the Union itself is
concerned, however, nothing of the sort happened.
In terms of grand legal culture or method, the Union is indeed inspired by the
common law. But contra Schmitt, if there is an overarching mindset, it would seem
to be (ironically, given Brexit) English, not German. As with the creation of the
common law in England, we can think of European Union law as a kind of “overlay”
on top of existing laws, customs, and legal institutions. The Union builds on each
Member State’s existing traditions as much as possible, as opposed to remaking
national laws, customs, and legal institutions radically in the EU’s image. That is
as it should be, as the Union’s pluralist polity is only loosely consolidated, with
a characteristic common law legislature that acts in an “episodic” fashion (i.e.,
legislating only periodically and mostly on isolated issues, not setting out to produce
a comprehensive unifying code). Indeed, EU law leaves in place more variation
among the laws of its component states than any other federal-type system in the
world.6)Daniel Halberstam and Mathias Reimann, Federalism and Legal Unification:
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A Comparative Empirical Investigation of Twenty Systems (2013). If anything, in
terms of Europe’s legal culture and method, the legal systems of the commonwealth
and the United States, not Germany and its civil law sisters, may serve as guides.
The EU’s judiciary is empowered in all this, but its reasoning, too, has not followed
the tradition of Savigny or any other particularly German scholarly method or
culture.7)To be sure, the CJEU follows the German Constitutional Court’s balancing
method of fundamental rights analysis – but which Western high court (other than
that of the United States) does not? This successful German global export has
little to do with the present subject. On that score, the latest attempt of the German
Constitutional Court to supervise the CJEU’s “methodische Grundsätze” (para. 112)
may be misleading, as the decision was more of a policy squabble wrapped in a
misguided judgment of a departing President and a Court that had barked so much it
felt it needed to bite just once as well.
To the contrary, in the larger picture of European legal method, Germany has been
openly playing catch-up in terms of bringing its national scholarly enterprise in
line with global (U.S. inspired) trends. Given the relative weakness of the Union
legislature, and its episodic interventions, the EU judiciary has indeed been free to
expound on legal texts under a self-created (again, common law inspired) system
of precedent. The EU’s high court has thereby situated itself as interlocutor in
dialogue not just with national courts, but with Union and national politics writ large.
In doing so, the Court has drawn inspiration in pragmatic ecumenical fashion from all
corners – whether teleological considerations, doctrinal analysis, law and economics,
empirical studies, common constitutional traditions, moral and political theory, and
even the winds of politics. If there’s an analogue for the CJEU, the closest (though
imperfect, as well) lies not somewhere in Germany, but in the Supreme Court of the
United States.
While not leading Europe’s legal method, Germany has surely done well in terms
of policy – but here, again, Germany’s leadership may be contested. Given its
structural embeddedness at the very core of the European enterprise, its economic
heft, and its population relative to the other Member States, Germany is the 800-
pound gorilla in Europe. But despite its frequently successful policy leadership (and
policy obstruction), Germany has also given in, even on several of its previous red
lines.8)See, e.g., Simon Bulmer & William E. Paterson, Germany and the European
Union: Europe’s Reluctant Hegemon? (2019); Joachim Schild, ‘The myth of German
hegemony in the euro area revisited’, 43 West European Politics 1072-1094
(2020). Think only of Mario Draghi’s softening of the no-bail out clause, or the latest
Corona virus assistance package (which, again, emerged out of Franco-German
cooperation).9)See, e.g., Georg Blume, ‘Endlich Wieder Liebe’, Die Zeit (May 18,
2020), available here ; Un nouveau départ franco-allemand pour l’Europe’ (Editorial,
Le Monde, May 19, 2020), available here. It would seem premature, then, to
conclude that Germany has left the others behind, and is leading Europe on its own.
Far worse than misjudging its current position in the Union, however, would be
making the mistake of encouraging Germany (with or without professed reluctance)
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to take on the role of hegemon in Europe.10)See, e.g., Christoph Schönberger,
‘Hegemon wider Willen. Zur Stellung Deutschlands in der Europäischen Union‘,
66(1) Merkur 1-8 (2012); ‘The Reluctant Hegemon; Germany and Europe‘, The
Economist, June 15, 2013, p.12. We should be wary here not just of Carl Schmitt,
but also of Heinrich Triepel, whose work still seems to serve – uncritically – as
benchmark for such debates in Germany.11)Even opponents of the hegemony
thesis in Germany rely on Triepel uncritically, indeed celebrating their common
reliance on Triepel as a purportedly sober and exact foundation for the debate.
See, e.g., Werner Link, ‘Integratives Gleichgewicht und gemeinsame Führung: Das
europäische System und Deutschland,‘ 66(11) Merkur 1021-34 (2012); Werner
Link, ‘Keine deutsche Hegemonie,‘ Merkur Blog, June 18, 2013, available here.
Like Schmitt, Triepel saw past the simplistic positivism of his time, drawing broadly
on comparative and interdisciplinary insights to craft original ideas with brilliant
precision. And yet, as with Schmitt, there is a dark side to Triepel’s shining work.
To be sure, Triepel was a more traditional national conservative, who ultimately
distanced himself from the Nazi-regime (in part, perhaps, because his wife was of
Jewish origin).12)See, e.g., Ralph Poscher, ‘Heinrich Triepel’, in Arthur Jacobson
and Bernhard Schlink (eds.), Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis 171, 174 (2000);
Ulrich M. Gassner, Heinrich Triepel: Leben und Werk 102f., 186ff. (1999). But
Triepel, too, was a staunch opponent of parliamentary democracy and interest group
pluralism. One need only read his hailing the Ermächtigungsgesetz of 1933 as a
“legal revolution” reflecting “Germanic legal sensibilities,” and as happily signaling
“the death of the Volk-destroying individualism, on whose fields 19th Century
parliamentarism alone could grow rampant.”13)Heinrich Triepel, ‘Die nationale
Revolution und die deutsche Verfassung‘, Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, April 2,
1933, pp.1-2. Cf., e.g., Horst Dreier, Staatsrecht in Demokratie und Diktatur 56, 270
(2016); Bardo Fassbender, ‚Heinrich Triepel und die Anfänge der dualistischen Sicht
von „Völkerrecht und Landesrecht“ im späten 19. Jahrhundert,‘ in Lukas Gschwend
et al. (eds.), Recht im digitalen Zeitalter – Festgabe Schweizerischer Juristentag
2015 in St. Gallen. pp. 449, 459-60 (2015). No surprise that Triepel’s big book was
a paean to Prussia and unitary leadership, and presented hegemony as a legitimate
path to restoring fractured social unity.14)See Heinrich Triepel, Die Hegemonie: Ein
Buch von Führenden Staaten 294, 566-567 (1938). Cf. Perry Anderson, The H-
Word: The Peripeteia of Hegemony 56 (2017). The basic idea was consistent with
his longstanding preference for “the enlightened or unenlightened despotism of an
individual over the despotism of the never enlightened masses.”15)Heinrich Triepel,
Unitarismus und Föderalismus im Deutschen Reiche: eine staatsrechtliche und
politische Studie 119 (1907). In cheering on a hegemon, then, Triepel did not have
much to lose. We do.
Rather than our cheering on an emerging hegemon, the imperfect project of the
European Union demands our constant vigilance. Buried in the Preamble’s promise
of an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” (“d’une union sans cesse
plus étroite”) lies Zeno’s paradox, that in this ever closer union, a unitary people will
never come. But buried in the Preamble also lies the even more profound idea that
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anti-hegemony itself is a projet sans cesse, i.e., that anti-hegemony will never be
done.
The project of anti-hegemony is ongoing, and it comes with constant discontents,
as well it should. This must not discourage us. It should spur us on to work against
the imperfections we see today – whether they be German hegemony, Franco-
German hegemony, incomplete democracy, or the lack of inclusion more broadly.
Even if we were to overcome all these, new imperfections, including some we
may not understand today, will appear – and then we must turn our efforts against
those. In short, the struggle against hegemony in Europe can never cease. We
must, therefore, resist the impulse to seek out and cheer on Germany as leader.
The European Union neither wants nor needs Germany as hegemon. Team player
should be enough.
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